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An Experiential, Inclusive Approach to Hope 
Introduction 
Contemporary accounts of hope turn away from religious connotations, or tendencies to 
focus only on future goods, instead studying hope as a rational and ubiquitous feature of human 
life (Pettit 2004, 153). In this context, philosophers commonly draw on the Standard Account 
(Meirav 2009, 218) account of hope, which proposes two independently necessary and jointly 
sufficient conditions for hope: 1) that the object of hope must be desired by the hoper, and (2) 
that achievement of the object is viewed by the hoper as neither certain nor impossible (the 
‘estimative and desiderative’ criteria for hope; see Downie 1963, 248f).1  
Unfortunately, the philosophical literature tends to obscure actual experiences of hope, 
and inadequately attends to the importance of agent self-perception and developmental factors 
leading to hope. This kind of theorizing leaves important gaps in our understanding of the 
phenomenon, particularly regarding the characteristics of a hopeful experience. This lack of 
clarity is apparent given several philosophers’ recent bids to supplement the Standard Account’s 
criteria.2 Psychological researchers have also recently worked to clarify how people experience 
hope, with a notable focus on the hopers’ developmental histories and self-perceived agency. I 
argue that philosophers’ oversights of these factors lead them to counterintuitive descriptions of 
hope. Further, I submit that taking cues from psychological studies will help incorporate relevant 
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agent-specific factors into philosophical accounts of hope, in turn helping to clarify what is lost 
by subscribing to the Standard Account.  
I. What Has Been Lost: On the Standard Account’s Bare-Bones Approach 
In the contemporary literature on hope, two commonly cited attempts to explicate hope 
are R. S. Downie’s 1963 article “Hope,” and J. P. Day’s 1991 book Hope: A Philosophical 
Inquiry. Downie states that “there are two criteria which are independently necessary and jointly 
sufficient for hope […:] the first is that the object of hope must be desired by the hoper […and] 
the second criterion is that the hoper must at least believe that the fulfilment of the hope falls 
within a certain range of probabilities” (Downie 1963, 248). Day offers his own formulation of 
the two conditions: “‘A hopes in some degree that P’ entails (1) ‘A wishes [desires] in some 
degree that P’ and (2) ‘A thinks that P is in some degree probable’ […and] may be called the 
desiderative and the estimative tests (Downie 1963, 98).  
Although these two conditions are said to be critical features of hope, both philosophers 
briefly mention some of hope’s further complexities that they do not deem critical to their 
accounts. One of the main concerns, according to Downie, is that “there is a certain conceptual 
connection between ‘hope to do’ and ‘intend to do’” (Downie 1963. 251) that means hoping also 
entails a will to act to bring about what is hoped for. Day echoes this concern, adding that “‘A 
wishes that P’ entails ‘A is disposed to try to bring it about that P’” (Day 1991, 98), thus 
highlighting the relevance of a hoper’s willingness to act as a significant characteristic of at least 
some cases of hope. I may desire that I receive a good grade on an assignment, and I may 
estimate that this is neither impossible nor certain. According to the Standard Account, this 
would rightly be called “hope.” However, in cases where relevant action can be taken, questions 
arise as to whether my desire for a good grade, combined with my belief in the possibility of 
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receiving this grade, really merit the name “hope” if I am not at least willing to do anything to 
bring this about. In fact, it seems that this would be more rightly called an instance of “wishing” 
or even “wishful thinking” on my part, since a “hope” on which I am unwilling to act (when I am 
able to) seems in bad faith. The failure to further develop the connection between hope and a 
disposition to act indicates that more can be said with regards to hope’s relation to action.  
A related complication for Downie and Day involves explaining their claim that “the 
object [of hope must fall] within a range of physical probabilities” (Downie 1963, 249), i.e. 
between certainty and impossibility in order to constitute hope. If one believes the object of their 
hope to be probable or likely to come about, then, according to Day, some of the standards used 
to evaluate the reasonableness of beliefs should also apply to hopes. He notes, however, that 
while we can say “‘A’s hope that P’ is reasonable although P is improbable” (Day 1991, 101), 
the same does not seem to hold for beliefs. If I live in Los Angeles, and I believe that it will 
snow this December, this belief could be deemed unreasonable, due to the improbability of snow 
in Los Angeles. Replace my belief for a hope that it will snow, and it’s not so easy to dismiss this 
hope as unreasonable; after all, it has snowed in Los Angeles before!3 This disanalogy between 
beliefs and hopes uncovers questions about the role of implicit or explicit probability 
assignments involved in hope. The Standard Account tells us that we need view a hope as neither 
certain nor impossible, but it seems further investigation is needed to draw out rules for rational 
or appropriate probability thresholds. This is another case in which the Standard Account hints at 
another of hope’s complexities without developing it in detail: although it seems clear that an 
agent’s desire for a hoped-for prospect may affect its perceived likelihood (thus making hope 
different from belief) the standard account says little about the rationality of hope and its 
relationship to evidence.  
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Lastly, Downie notes that if hope implies a state of “comparative expectation” (Downie 
1963, 250) it entails the exhibition of behavioural patterns “accompanied by characteristic 
pleasurable feelings” (Downie 1963, 250). In other words, if hope involves expecting or 
anticipating an outcome comparatively more than merely believing in the possibility of that 
outcome, or despairing of it, then hope should also entail relevant differences in the agent’s 
behaviour. For example, if Sally hopes for a snow day, but Alex simply believes the snow day to 
be possible, we might say that Sally is in a state of comparative expectation with regards to the 
possibility of a snow day. Downie’s claim here suggests that we should expect Sally to act 
differently than Alex in light of her hope—perhaps staying up late or slacking on homework—
and that she would feel pleased about this in a way that Alex, who is more reserved about the 
prospect, would not. Day also endorses this complication, and adds that hopes, like dispositions, 
admit of degrees: for, it is not that Sally either entirely expects a snow day, while Alex clearly 
does not; rather, it is more precise to say that Sally and Alex are on a spectrum of expectation, 
wherein significant differences in degree are labelled according to benchmarks associated with 
different degrees—for example, “hope,” “neutral consideration of a possibility,” and “despair.” 
Both thinkers, however, bracket this concern as irrelevant to their own analysis of hope, claiming 
that its dispositional features belong to a separate analysis of what it means to be hopeful that 
something will occur, rather than to their proposed analysis, which applies to “hope that.”4 In 
other words, they allow that analyses of hopeful disposition, or the way people hope, may be 
interesting for some purposes, but not strictly required as parts of analyses of an individual’s 
hope for or hope that a specific outcome will be realized.  
Bracketing this aspect of hope, however, raises some important questions about the 
nature of hope: for example, imagine Sally and Alex both desire a snow day and, having the 
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exact same evidence, assign it the same probability. How are we to explain Sally’s being hopeful 
for the snow day without considering that she is, in some way, disposed to hope in a way that 
Alex is not? Put another way, it remains to be seen how different agents perceive the same 
circumstances as an occasion for hope, or just another day. Answering this question involves 
going beyond the Standard Account’s criteria, to investigate the way Alex and Sally experience 
their respective desires for and estimations concerning a snow day. We may even need to delve 
into the particularities that are Sally and Alex themselves.  
While developing a detailed account of a hopeful disposition may turn out to be outside 
the scope of both Day and Downie’s projects, their bracketing of the above dimensions of hope 
leaves room for more to be said. Insofar as their accounts exclude the above complexities, they 
offer a partial picture of hope. Developing a more comprehensive account of the phenomenon 
will, I shall argue, involve delving into the nuances of the agent’s experience, including agents’ 
willingness to act on their hope, the justification for hope, and the nature of the relevant desires. I 
aim to show that neglecting to investigate the agent’s individual experience of hope may 
exacerbate confusion among philosophers trying to expand upon the Standard Account. My 
intent in taking up these complexities is not to criticize the Standard Account for failing to 
address them, rather, I take them to indicate which aspects of hope theory merit further 
development. Though the majority of my work throughout the paper is intended to be 
complementary to the Standard Account, I undertake some critical work in later sections, where 
I consider some counterexamples that may pose difficulties for the Standard Account in the 
absence of other complementary work bolstering the theory.  
The next section, however, asks what the mutual concerns of Day and Downie tell us 
about correcting or supplementing the Standard Account, and what can we learn about hope from 
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delving into these complications. I begin to answer these questions by considering some recent 
attempts by philosophers to expand upon and even subvert the Standard Account.  
III.  Philosophical Attempts to Bridge the Gap  
Arguing that the desiderative and estimative criteria for hope (i.e. “A wishes [desires] in 
some degree that P” and “A thinks that P is in some degree probable”) are too reductive,5 and 
that the Standard Account of hope overlooks the way a person hopes, several philosophers have 
recently focused on expanding the Standard Account to better incorporate these considerations 
within hope theory. Here I will briefly consider the attempts of three philosophers. 
In his 1999 paper “The Value of Hope,” Luc Bovens argued that “hoping is just having 
the proper belief and desire in conjunction with being engaged to some degree in mental imaging 
[… where ‘mental imaging’ signifies] the devotion of mental energy to what it would be like if 
some projected state of the world were to materialize” (Bovens 1999, 674). In a clear attempt to 
expand upon the desiderative criterion, he notes that the conjunction of the belief in an event’s 
possibility, combined with a desire that it obtain, is not sufficient to merit a hope (674). Although 
I both see it as possible and desirable that I might find twenty dollars on the street, for example, 
it is not clear that I’ve hoped for this to happen unless I’ve spent more than a passing moment 
thinking about the possibility and its desirability. There are many kinds of things which we 
would both agree are possible and desirable but would hesitate to label “hopes.” In this way, 
Bovens uncovers what he believes to be a third necessary criterion for hope—namely, what I will 
call the mental imaging criterion, the agent’s mental engagement with the possibility of their 
hope.  
Similarly, in Philip Pettit’s 2004 work, “Hope and its Place in Mind,” he adds that a hope 
worth the name or a “substantial hope” means “…invest[ing a] scenario with a level of 
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confidence that may exceed the confidence of [one’s] actual belief in the prospect and with a 
degree of stability that will certainly exceed the stability of [one’s] actual belief” (Pettit 2004, 
159). Consider a student completing a lengthy PhD application despite having an only slightly 
above-average GPA, and despite their knowledge that the program admits only two percent of 
applicants. Beyond desiring admission to the program and believing admission possible, the 
student displays a hope worth the name when they continue to plan for and apply to the program, 
even when their belief in the possibility of acceptance has waned or died.  
Comparing hoping to planning or precaution, Pettit says hoping means putting whatever 
beliefs one may have about a hope’s unlikelihood aside, in order to “organize [one’s] responses 
and [one’s] efforts around the assumption that the prospect is firmly on the horizon” (Pettit 2004, 
159), much like the PhD application student completes in the above example. In other words, for 
Pettit, one’s desiring a hoped-for prospect properly constitutes a hope when the hoper is willing 
to behave as if they were much more likely than not to attain what they hope for—I will call this 
Pettit’s acting-as-if criterion. Unlike Bovens, however, Pettit does not reject the Standard 
Account as insufficient for identifying hope; rather, his account complements it by investigating 
hopeful behaviours, the inclusion of which, over and above those desires and beliefs about a 
prospect, enable the Standard Account to distinguish between what Pettit calls substantial cases 
of hope, and more trivial cases that qualify as hopes in a weaker sense.  
In his 2009 work, “The Nature of Hope,” Ariel Meirav takes further issue with the 
Standard Account, as well as Bovens’ approach to amending it. Firstly, Meirav points out its 
failure to distinguish between the different kinds of probabilities that may be involved in hope: 
“epistemic probability (a measure of the strength of the available evidence for a proposition), 
physical probability (a measure of the tendency of the world to develop in such a way as to make 
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the proposition true), and subjective probability (a measure of the strength of one’s belief […])” 
(Meirav 2009, 219–220). Meirav asserts that the failure to distinguish between these probabilities 
creates ambiguity in the Standard Account; in turn, the Standard Account struggles to distinguish 
substantial cases of hope, such as the hope to be saved from great peril, from more trivial hopes, 
such as having a snow day away from work (Meirav 2009, 220). Meirav then suggests Bovens’ 
account is also victim to this ambiguity, and challenges his counterexamples, which are 
analogous to the above case of the twenty-dollar bill. According to Meirav, proponents of the 
Standard Account could simply agree that a person is indeed not hoping for something before 
they have given some significant thought to the prospect.  
Meirav then goes farther, making it clear that his problems with the Standard Account go 
beyond this charge of ambiguity or incompleteness, stating that the Standard Account is false 
because it rests on a fundamentally mistaken idea, namely that: “one’s hope for a prospect p 
supervenes on the particulars of one’s desire for and assignment of probability to p (for this only 
implies that if one does hope for p, then one’s particular intensity of desire for p, in combination 
with the particular probability one assigns to p, jointly constitute a sufficient condition for 
hoping for p)” (Meirav 2009, 221). What Meirav is thus trying to emphasize is that a desire 
(however intense) and a probability assignment between certainty and impossibility is not always 
enough to entail hope. Meirav believes that the Standard Accounts’ reliance on the (mistaken) 
idea that probability assignment and desire are sufficient for hope leaves it unable to distinguish 
hope from despair, because “according to the Standard Account, we despair of what we want 
simply because we think it is not sufficiently likely” (Meirav 2009, 219). Consider one of 
Meirav’s counter-examples6: suppose he, Meirav, purchases a lottery ticket for ten dollars, for 
the chance of winning one million dollars. Upon returning home, he is very enthusiastic about 
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having purchased the ticket, and his wife is indifferent to this exact same prospect, namely, 
winning the lottery. In this case, they both know the exact odds of winning (1/100,000), which 
accounts for their assigning the prospect of winning the same epistemic probability (Meirav 
2009, 224). He then claims that their difference in enthusiasm need not reflect any different 
degree of subjective probability. To support this claim, he draws on a decision-theoretic 
approach: 
The subjective probability that A assigns to proposition p is proportional to the monetary 
value that A places on the following offer: receive sum S if p, and receive nothing if it is 
not the case that p. According to this criterion, the assumption that both my wife and I 
assign a subjective probability of 1/100,000 to the prospect of winning corresponds to the 
assumption that both of us place a monetary value of $10 on the following offer: receive 
$1,000,000 if the ticket wins, and receive nothing if it does not. Now, suppose our 
subjective probability assignments are as I have just said, and that I paid $10 for the 
ticket. There seems to be nothing odd about my wife’s indifference. After all, I paid $10 
for something that in her view is worth exactly that. […] What is there to be enthusiastic 
about? (Meirav 2009, 224-225)7 
According to Meirav, the above example is evidence that relevant probability 
assignments and desires are not always sufficient for distinguishing hope from despair. This 
means that one’s enthusiasm (taken to be indicative of hope) for a prospect may be constitutively 
influenced by more than just desires and probability assignments. If it is indeed possible for one 
party to despair of a prospect while the other hopes for it, despite identical subjective probability 
assignments and relevant desires, then perhaps equipping the Standard Account for dealing with 
such cases involves referencing the hoper’s relationship to other, external factors. Thus, Meirav 
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begins to develop his own amendment to the Standard Account, the external factor account 
(Meirav 2009, 227), by qualifying the kind of desire involved in hope in two ways. First, he 
notes that hoping for something seems to imply that it is beyond our causal or epistemic powers 
in some way—it seems entirely wrong to say that one “hopes” for a prospect which could easily 
be accessed or attained without any resistance whatsoever (Meirav 2009, 229)—for example, “I 
hope to make a sandwich for lunch” or “I hope to visit my next-door neighbour.” Second, he 
notes that desires involved in hope are “resignative,” not in the sense that one resigns oneself to 
or despairs over the fulfillment of ones’ hopes, but only to one’s lack of [total] control over its 
fulfilment (Meirav 2009, 229). 
For Meirav, these qualifications point to the importance of external factors for the nature 
of hope, because seeing a prospect as beyond the scope of one’s control necessarily involves 
“some conception of an external factor […] distinct from both self and prospect, as possessing 
the power to determine causally whether or not the desired prospect will obtain” (Meirav 2009, 
230). Thus, the external factor account includes one’s attitude toward such factors as necessary 
for distinguishing hope from despair in some cases8: “…if one views [whatever external factors 
may be relevant to the actualization of their hope] as good, then one hopes for the prospect. If 
one views [them] as not good, then one despairs of it” (Meirav 2009, 230). For example, if I 
want to find a certain elusive manuscript in a library, according to Meirav I will hope to find it if 
I perceive the librarians as knowledgeable and helpful persons, instead of lazy and unfriendly 
people who are difficult to deal with. In the case that I see external factors—such as librarians—
as resources rather than obstacles to the achievement of the hoped-for manuscript, my limited 
agency (my inability to find the manuscript on my own) would signal an occasion for hope rather 
than despair. Put another way, this distinction is the difference between thinking, “My own 
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research abilities have been tapped out, but surely I’ll be able to find it with the help of these 
librarians!” and, “Those librarians never help anyone without a fight, if I have to depend on 
them, I’ll never find the manuscript!” 
The above elaborations on the Standard Account attempt to fill theoretical gaps and can 
be used to help gain further clarity about hope. Among those attempting to expand upon or 
challenge the Standard Account9 there is, for example, a noticeable emphasis on the individual’s 
experience of hope. This is evidenced by the fact that Bovens, Meirav, and Pettit turn their 
attention to the way hopers hope by considering examples of hopeful experiences, shedding 
further light on how the desiderative and estimative criteria proposed by Downie and Day bear 
on the effectiveness of the Standard Account in identifying cases of hope. Bovens looks to 
experiences of hope to find that mental imaging is a characteristic form of investment that is part 
of desiring what one hopes for; Meirav finds that hopes, where non-trivial and not highly 
probable, can be distinguished by a positive perception of external factors indicating a hoper’s 
trust in the possibility of their desired outcome; and Pettit suggests that behaviours resembling 
those associated with planning or precaution are also good indicators of hope. Earlier, we saw 
that Day and Downie’s account brackets investigation into agents’ experiences, treating desire 
and estimation as abstract concepts whose presence is sufficient for hope, regardless of how this 
might change from hoper to hoper. Here, we begin to notice Bovens, Pettit, and Meirav move 
toward incorporating more specific attributes of hopeful experience into their accounts, the 
inclusion of which more directly implies the need for knowledge of the individual hoper in 
question. We need to know relatively little or nothing about a hoper herself in order for their 
experience to count as a “hope” under the standard account—it’s enough if we know that the 
hoper both desires something and believes it to be neither certain nor impossible. Desire and 
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probability assignment in this sense can easily be impersonally conceived, and the corresponding 
experience labelled “hope” via the Standard Account’s minimum necessary and sufficient 
conditions. If you and I both desire the presence of our mutual friend at a party and deem the 
friend’s presence to be neither impossible nor certain, under the Standard Account, we 
understand that both you and I hope that our friend will attend; no further investigation is 
necessary. Conversely, Meirav, Bovens, and Pettit seem to be moving away from this relative 
neglect of the hoper, by arguing that features of the way or extent to which a hoper hopes is 
indeed relevant, and (especially in Meirav’s case) necessary if we are to identify hope and 
distinguish it from other phenomena.  
But within this small selection of views that elaborate on the Standard Account, there is 
already an obvious lack of consensus about which experiences should count as relevant 
ingredients for hope in difficult cases—that is, those in which a real hope cannot be easily 
identified by the Standard Account alone. Our new obstacle in the search for a robust account of 
hope is a lack of clarity about what kinds of experiences are key to a complete picture of hope. 
Thus, the challenge here is to determine which kinds of experiences ought to be included in a 
more comprehensive and agent-focused account of hope. Given that attention to agents’ 
experiences of hope have only recently become a relevant consideration in the philosophical 
literature, the following section turns to positive psychology for help, as researchers in this field 
have indeed dwelt on agents’ experiences in their hope research.  
III. A New Approach to the Experience: Thoughts, Origins, and the Need for an 
Inclusive Account of Hope 
i. Hopeful Thoughts 
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In the The Rules of Hope, the psychologists Averill, Catlin, and Chon seek “implicit 
theories that people use when reasoning about hope in everyday affairs” (Averill, Catlin, and 
Chon 1990, 10) in an attempt to find intelligible patterns within subjects’ experiences of hope. 
They hypothesized that an analysis of subjects’ self-reported, hope-related behaviours and 
thoughts would shed light on the nature of the phenomenon. With this in mind, Averill et al. 
conducted four studies that used self-reporting methods to identify patterns of beliefs and 
behaviours within individuals’ hopeful experiences. Although Averill et al. were unable to 
associate hope with specific responses that applied in every case, their study helped them discern 
four “proto-rules” or guidelines for hope: (1) “prudential rules” dictate that “when the probability 
of attainment [of a goal] is too low, hope is inappropriate” (Averill et al. 1990, 33); (2) 
“moralistic rules” suggest that “the object of hope is circumscribed not only by what is prudent 
or reasonable, but also by what is socially acceptable, i.e. by moral values” (Averill et al. 1990, 
33); (3) “priority rules” separate hopes from more trivial wants and desires by aligning them with 
“a person’s vital interests”(Averill et al. 1990, 33); and (4) “action rules” state that “people who 
hope would be willing to take appropriate action to achieve their goals, if action is possible” 
(Averill et al. 1990. 34).10 Averill et al,’s research is worth highlighting because it suggests 
individuals’ experiences can inform theories of hope. Specifically, they brought attention to what 
hopeful agents characteristically do, and how this hopeful behaviour is influenced by evaluative, 
self-referential thinking. For example, when Averill asked one hundred and fifty college students 
to describe something they hoped for, versus something they desired but did not hope for, 
responses were sorted into groups according to subjects’ perceived personal control versus 
situational control over the outcome. The most common response chosen among seven possible 
actions to be taken in response to one’s hope “was to ‘work harder’: specifically, 88.5% of the 
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subjects who believed they had a high degree of personal control11 over the outcome reported 
“working ‘somewhat’ or ‘very much’ harder because of their hope; 63.2% of the subjects in the 
situation-control group did so” (Averill et al. 1990, 25). Averill et al. suggest that this outcome 
implies a connection between what a person does when they experience hope (e.g. “work 
harder”) and what a person believes they can do in a situation (corresponding to their perceived 
level of control).12  
Psychologist C. R. Snyder’s “Hope Theory: Rainbows in the Mind” 13 further develops on 
this insight about the importance of self-referential thoughts for hope, and his theory remains a 
prevailing framework in contemporary research. According to Snyder, hope is “a specific way of 
thinking about oneself” (Snyder 2002, 25), specifically, the perception of oneself as capable of 
finding and following through with ways to achieve personal goals. This renders hope as “the 
sum of the mental willpower and waypower that you have for your goals” (Snyder 2002, 5). 
Goals are defined as “objects, experiences, or outcomes that we imagine and desire in our 
minds”; willpower is defined as “a reservoir of determination and commitment that we can call 
on to help move us in the direction of the goal to which we are attending at any given moment” 
(Snyder 2002, 6), and waypower is a mental capacity we can call on to find one or more effective 
ways to reach our goals […or] the perception that one can engage in planful thought…” (Snyder 
2002, 8).  
While contemporary philosophers have also moved toward a focus on the way agents 
experience hope, Snyder’s account develops two factors that are somewhat neglected in 
philosophical accounts. The first of these is the kind of thoughts characteristic of hope. For 
example, Snyder observes that one’s willpower “reflects [one’s] thoughts about initiating and 
sustaining movement toward desired goals” (Snyder 2002, 7), and can be manifested in thoughts 
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such as “I can, I’ll try, I’m ready to do this, and I’ve got what it takes” (Snyder 2002, 6), whereas 
waypower is manifested in thoughts such as “’If [I] can’t do it one way, [I’ll] do it another 
way!’” (Snyder 2002, 7). The kinds of thoughts linked to hopeful experiences are 
overwhelmingly cast as self-appraisals regarding one’s ability to achieve one’s goals.14 
According to Snyder, this is in part due to a fortifying effect stemming from the tacit knowledge 
that “…even during stressful times when we run into blockages on the way to our goals, we have 
been able to generate the mental efforts to overcome them” (Snyder 2002, 7). In other words, 
positive self-appraisals strengthen us to face challenges, because they reflect our own knowledge 
or confidence that we are, in fact, capable of overcoming them. 
In a later article, Snyder explains that, during interviews for his initial hope research, 
participants’ general self-appraisals about their abilities to achieve goals were superseded by 
thoughts about their specific goals (Snyder 2002, 250). This means that a hope, for Snyder, 
involves a detailed look at the way one thinks about oneself in relation to that outcome and its 
pursuit. Suppose, for example, I view a good grade on an algebra test as a desirable and possible 
outcome. However, if hope is, in part, a function of my self-referential thoughts, and I think 
myself liable to err in mathematics or unworthy of success, my self-referential thoughts may 
indicate a diminished or absent hope for an A+.15 Further, these thoughts may even affect 
whether I see a math test as an occasion for hope at all. A fuller investigation into hope, then, 
should pay close attention to its self-referential dimensions of hope revealed in the thoughts of 
hopers, and regard these as important to the clarification of the phenomenon of hope. Indeed, one 
aspect of the hoper’s experience begins to clarify here: there seems to be a connection between 
“enduring, self-referential thoughts about [one’s] capacities to [find the routes to and motivation 
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for one’s] goals” (Snyder 2002, 250) and whether (and to what degree) someone’s relevant 
desires and possibility assignments qualify as hopes. 
So far, we have seen that Snyder thinks hope involves particular thoughts about oneself 
as an effective agent, one who is able to bring about a desired goal, even when difficulties 
arise—but what about cases in which one’s agency is limited? Imagine you find an injured dog 
on the road and rush it to the vet as fast as you can, in the hopes of sparing its life. Clearly, 
thoughts such as “I’ll be able to make it to the vet in time!” or “It’s worth seeing what I can do, 
I’ve helped in emergencies before!” could strengthen you to the task of rescuing the dog and fuel 
your hope of saving it. However, once the dog has been delivered into veterinary care, you may 
continue to hope for its recovery even though those hopeful thoughts about getting to the vet and 
helping initially are no longer applicable and so seemingly no longer contributing to your 
hopeful state. Can such thoughts shed light on hope, even when hopes outlast them?  
Snyder thinks so; he posits a link between the hoper’s self-evaluative thoughts and a 
more general sense she has of herself as a capable, effective agent. Snyder posits that successful 
goal pursuits breed further successful pursuits, due to the reinforcing character of the requisite 
positive emotions.16 When people achieve their goals, they feel good about themselves, which 
reinforces the sense of self as effective causal instigator, in turn causing them to attempt more 
pursuits and reinforcing the cycle—a self-reinforcing feedback loop.17,18 In short, those whose 
goals are met (or whose hopes are attained) typically experience positive emotions, and these 
emotions in turn strengthen one’s sense of self as capable, as well as strengthening the perception 
that one’s goals are worthwhile (Snyder 1994, 52–53). Those feelings and perceptions help fuel 
further hope and attainment of goals. 
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This feedback loop could potentially explain how one’s self-evaluative thoughts are 
linked to one’s ability to hope even as their agency becomes limited. Return to the case of the 
injured dog. The person who sees herself as an effective agent may be heartened by their 
previous experiences expending efforts in difficult situations (such as rushing the dog to the 
hospital). Having experienced payoffs in times of difficulty, they may be more inclined to 
believe that their efforts are worthwhile—or in this case, to hope that the dog will be saved. 
Conversely, the person who doubts the effectiveness of their agency may be less likely to try and 
succeed in the face of challenging situations, as manifested in thoughts such as: “That poor dog 
is hurt, but I’ll never be able to make it to the vet on time!” or “The dog’s injury is too serious, 
there’s nothing I can do!” If a person thinks of herself as an ineffective agent, a consequential 
reticence to try to affect outcomes in such challenging situations may contribute to a feedback 
loop in which this person experiences less payoff for their actions and less reinforcement of their 
hopes as worthwhile.19  
If there is in fact a link between a hopers’ self-evaluative thoughts and their tendency to 
hope, then more fine-grained self-referential and evaluative thoughts than those picked out by the 
Standard Account can be seen as typical ingredients of hope. However, more needs to be said to 
clarify the role this kind of thinking about agency plays in hope. For example, if these kinds of 
thoughts fuel a self-sustaining cycle that promotes hopeful thinking, what makes some people 
more inclined to this way of thinking? This brings us to the second way in which Snyder’s 
approach to agents’ experience of hope differs from other accounts. Namely, Snyder considers 
the origins of hopeful thoughts and their development (Snyder 1994, 7).  
ii. Origins and Development of Hopeful Thinking 
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Beyond merely positing that willpower- and waypower-thoughts are typical of hope, 
Snyder believes that understanding the kinds of developmental experiences that contribute to and 
shape these thoughts is significant for understanding what hope is. Drawing on research in 
developmental psychology, Snyder notes that as infants begin to make connections or 
associations they are acquiring “anchors for comprehending the chronology of happenings”20 
(Snyder 1994, 79), which help them make sense of and navigate their reality in a meaningful 
way. An infant’s recognition of herself as the originator or instigator of events, combined with 
her ability to establish causal linkages, form the building blocks of goal-oriented or “hopeful” 
thinking (Synder 1994, 83)—the self-referential waypower- and willpower-thoughts discussed 
above.  
Building on Bowlby’s attachment theory,21 Snyder hypothesizes that hope is largely 
influenced by primary caregivers, because they demonstrate and coach children about causal, 
goal-oriented thinking, and act as the primary allies for children in achieving their goals, even if 
these are something as simple as receiving a snack or a toy (Snyder 1994, 84).22 Though it is no 
surprise that children become upset when they experience barriers, a 1975 study by Cornelius F. 
M. van Lieshout found that toddlers reacted differently to the obstruction of a desired toy when 
their mothers were present. Instead of the tantrums that ensued in their mothers’ absence, the 
toddlers “made gestures that were apparently directed at getting the mother to help them remove 
the barrier to the toy” (van Lieshout, as referenced in Snyder 1994, 84). This study suggests 
children sometimes practice productively incorporating frustration plus moving forward without 
relinquishing the goal altogether.23 Further barrier-related studies suggest that delays in 
gratification and barriers to children’s goals may be key in fostering hope, insofar as the 
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“successful handling of difficult transactions begets children empowered to find solutions to 
future problems” (Snyder 1994, 86),24 developing their self-perceived effective agency.  
Research in attachment theory also serves as a basis for Snyder’s hypothesis that early 
experiences are significant for the development of hopeful thinking. Following Bowlby, Snyder 
suggests that when the infant is securely attached to their caregiver(s), the development of hope 
is facilitated in the child (Snyder 1994, 87) 25 This claim is premised on the idea that when 
caregivers are attentive and responsive to a child’s needs, the child internalizes this framework as 
a way of understanding the larger world, which, according to the caregiver’s consistency and 
attentiveness, can be seen as meaningful and safe or as confusing and threatening.26,27 A 
responsive and consistently attentive caregiver serves as a model for effective goal-related 
behaviours, and their interactive encouragement fosters a grasp of causal linkages that not only 
allow the child to come to see the availability of others as allies in goal pursuits, but help them 
learn to “trust in the reliability of self-initiated cause-and-effect-relationships” (Shorey et al. 
2002).  
This raises the idea that the encouragement children receive in secure parental 
relationships are foundational to hope’s waypower- and willpower-thinking, because such 
relationships create a safe and supportive environment in which a child can come to see herself 
as someone who can successfully engage in hopeful, goal-oriented thoughts and behaviours.28 
When the caregiver engages with the child’s goal pursuits, their coaching and support can 
increase the chances of success and reduce the pain of failure, which in turn renders engagement 
with one’s goals a more attractive prospect, likely to kickstart a self-reinforcing cycle. Snyder 
offers the illustrative example of a children’s Easter egg hunt he witnessed: while some 
caregivers offered little help with their child’s goal, urging them to “hurry up” or becoming 
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exasperated and finding the eggs for the child, others offered encouragement, reassuring their 
child that they were “doing great,” giving them hints about the eggs’ locations, and letting them 
know it was okay to ask for help if needed (Snyder 1994, 86-7). It is not difficult to tell which 
children are being encouraged to develop hopeful thinking. A child may struggle to perceive 
herself as capable, if their caregivers frequently treat them in ways that suggest they are not. 
 This attention to attachment and parenting in children’s earliest experiences suggests that 
one’s particular developmental history is relevant to understanding how one hopes, by showing 
that this history, especially in terms of interactions with caregivers, shapes the agentic thought 
that is shown to be closely linked to hope. This uncovers some relevant factors in hope that go 
overlooked if hope is studied only in terms of an abstract goal, desire, and probability 
assessment. It is becoming clearer that hope should additionally be thought of as a way of 
engaging with the world as a place that is responsive, makes sense, and is full of opportunities. In 
particular, Snyder’s developmental focus clarifies that hope is something that has roots in our 
most basic forms of engagement with the world—our perceptions—and the foundations of hope 
may be present even before desires can be articulated and probabilities consciously assessed.  
iii. Thoughts and Origins: Combined for an Inclusive Account of Hope 
In this section, I draw out and summarize two agent-specific factors emerging from the 
above discussion of psychological work, which I combine with the standard account of hope to 
form my own inclusive account of hope.  
The first factor is that hope involves a perception of oneself as someone who can 
successfully pursue and achieve meaningful goals. I will call this the self-styled agent factor 
(SAF). The SAF is a critical component of hope, as hope involves the perception of oneself as 
capable of finding and following through with ways to achieve personal goals. A key insight 
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gained from thinking about this factor is that a fuller theory of hope should account for the 
agent’s perception of herself in relation to what is hoped for; for, how one perceives themselves 
in relation to an outcome, as we have seen, goes beyond desire and probability, to the core of 
one’s self-evaluation.  
The second factor is hope’s basis in the earliest stages of development, and its 
coextensive development with agency. I will call this the co-development factor (CDF). The 
most significant insight associated with this factor is the idea that hopeful behaviours and 
thinking begin before developed, articulable hopes are ever apparent. If the earliest stages of our 
development are the building blocks for hope, then a theory of hope may benefit from 
considering what this suggests about the nature of hope. I have previously submitted that this 
recommends viewing hope as a way of being in the world,29 a way of engaging with the world 
and being engaged by it. Put another way, the CDF suggests that, beyond developing 
coextensively with agency, hope is in part premised on the learned anticipation of opportunities 
rather than threats, and on trust instead of suspicion. 
Insights provided by the CDF and SAF are particularly relevant for developing hope 
theory because they help explicate the ways one’s environment is always already shaped by the 
hoper’s perceptions, which are in turn shaped by factors including their sense of trust or mistrust 
of the world, responsiveness to the world, and their active engagement with it. A focus on these 
two factors is central to my proposed Inclusive Account of hope, since the SAF and CDF 
represent two agent-relative factors that contextualize the desires and probability assessments the 
Standard Account already uses to identify hope. Specifically, the proponent of the Inclusive 
Account can look to a person’s self-perceived agency (accessed through the kinds of thoughts 
discussed above), and a person’s developmental history (accessed through information about 
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attachment and childhood experiences), as a way of expanding the Standard Account’s 
capabilities: while the Standard Account seems successful in its aim of determining that a person 
hopes, several philosophers, including Downie and Day themselves, have said that this bare-
bones approach leaves much more to be said. For example, we cannot necessarily infer the 
degree of hope from the intensity of a desire or the size of a probability assessment, especially 
when these criteria are divorced from the individual experiencing them. I may assign my 
winning a 50/50 draw a probability of 0.6 and think it very desirable, yet through years of 
disappointment and poor luck, after some consideration, I may be barely hopeful, restraining 
myself from fantasizing about the prospect, where another may be extremely hopeful in 
comparison to myself. Bovens and Pettit tried to address this sort of issue by adding a mental 
engagement, but it is unclear what mental engagement will tell us about a hope without further 
context about a person’s hopeful tendencies, which may be provided by incorporating SAF and 
CDF insights into Standard Account analysis. 
In this way, the Inclusive Account builds on the Standard Account by taking desire and a 
non-zero, non-unity probability assessment as jointly necessary and sufficient for hope, while 
also drawing on the relevance of SAF and CDF factors, allowing further analysis by relying on 
agent-relative criteria that contextualize the desires and probability assessments as belonging to a 
particular hoper. In practice, the Inclusive Account would thus involve identifying a probability 
assignment and desire as per the Standard Account, while also making use of information about a 
hoper’s self-perceived agency and developmental histories where further analysis can tell us 
about the nature of one’s hope, such as the degree or intensity.  
While Bovens and Pettit argued that the Standard Account overlooks a hoping agent’s 
mental engagement with a hoped-for prospect, Meirav argued we should add more to the 
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Standard Account. In the final section of this paper I will show how these CDF and SAF insights 
can help us further develop the attempts by Bovens, Pettit, and Meirav to focus on the way in 
which a particular agent hopes, and how an inclusive account of hope would help us avoid a 
difficulty encountered by Meirav. With the help of Bekka Williams, I argue that Meirav’s 
challenge results from an abstract conception of the agent, a tendency which shares in the 
Standard Account’s bracketing of agent-relative factors. I will then use SAF and CDF insights to 
propose an alternative to Meirav’s view, one that less abstractly adds to the Standard Account’s 
necessary conditions.30 
IV. Meirav’s External Factor Account: A Relic of the Standard Account’s 
Incompleteness? 
Going beyond Bovens’ and Pettit’s criticisms of the Standard Account, Meirav argues 
that that account rests on the flawed idea that hope supervenes on the particulars of a desire-
probability assignment combination, in relation to some prospect, p (Meirav 2009, 221). It is this 
exclusive focus, he claims, that leaves the Standard Account unable to distinguish hope from 
despair in some cases. For Meirav, since the relevant information concerning the agent’s desires, 
probability assessment, and the epistemic probability of the prospect are already referenced in 
such accounts, he believes that whatever is missing from them must be something totally “other” 
from self (the hoper) and the prospect (the hoped-for). Meirav’s external factor account thus 
offers to explain hope in terms of an attitude with respect to that which is out of one’s control. 
We saw, in the case of the lottery ticket, that this does not literally mean that Meirav perceives 
that the odds are better than his wife perceives them to be; rather, according to Meirav his sense 
of enthusiasm is grounded in the perception of an external factor as favourable regarding this 
prospect. This factor can perhaps be understood as a perception of “the universe” or of “luck.” 
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Meirav’s External Factor approach implies that whatever could help the Standard Account 
distinguish hope from despair could not be the agent herself. Indeed, Meirav’s turn to what is 
other or external to the hoper suggests that he thinks that whatever agent-specific factors are 
relevant for distinguishing hope from despair have already been exhausted: where desire and 
probability assessments are known, according to Meirav, it seems that the hope theorist must turn 
to what is entirely other for clues that distinguish an instance of hope from despair.  
I disagree. What Meirav seems to miss is that part of what is relevant about this 
“external” factor is indeed the agent’s attitude toward the factor. For example, in the case of the 
lottery ticket, much of what makes Meirav’s attitude toward luck useful in explaining his 
enthusiasm is his own perception of external factor x as favouring his winning. Glossing this in 
terms of something entirely other misses the potential importance of the way in which this 
perception is, at least in part, a product of one’s way of interacting with the world.  
Another reprise of the lottery ticket example may clarify this point. Meirav aims to show that we 
are unable to account for the differences between his wife’s enthusiasm and his own, in order to 
justify the turn to an external factor as a necessary move to explain the discrepancy. I suggest, 
however, that at least part of the force of this example relies on our lack of knowledge about 
Meirav and his wife themselves, and their respective ways of seeing or interacting with the 
world. Our ignorance about them as hopers helps to rule out the possibility of our discovering 
relevant internal or agent-relative factors – such as past experiences or tendencies affecting hope 
– that could be used to account for the differences in hope. 
This point is further clarified by considering an analogous case involving oneself and a 
close friend or loved one. It seems reasonable to look to our friend’s ways of thinking or facts 
about their developmental history as clues helping to explain a discrepancy in hope. My partner 
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Mike, for example, is excited about looking for a new apartment. We both have the same data 
about what is available on the market, and therefore may assign the possibility of finding a 
suitable home to have an identical epistemological probability. Yet Mike appears hopeful at this 
prospect, while I despair. Upon noticing this discrepancy, I do not, as Meirav might suggest, find 
myself at a loss to explain my different attitude. Rather, I note that when Mike is asked about his 
hopeful confidence, he simply states that “we’ll be able to find something if we look hard 
enough” and that “we’ll be able to make any place homey.” This kind of thinking is consistent 
with the fact that I know Mike to be, in general, more easily excited at this kind of prospect. It is 
also consistent with what I know about Mike’s past experiences: Mike moved several times as a 
child, occasions which he describes as having “always worked out okay”, and instances about 
which his mother, in particular “did not seem to be bothered or worried,” whereas I never 
moved, and my parents never expressed a desire to do so. 
The point here is not to defend a post-hoc connection between certain types of 
experiences and instances of hope. My aim is to point out that Mike’s thoughts and experiences 
concerning the prospect are potentially relevant behavioural measures I could appeal to in order 
to explain his enthusiastic behaviour, especially when comparing it to my own. In fact, my 
ability to appeal to this information leaves me not at all bewildered by Mike’s enthusiasm. If this 
kind of information has explanatory force in other such scenarios, then perhaps Meirav’s lottery 
ticket example need not necessarily arouse the kind of confusion used to justify the external 
factor account.  
Although a simplified version of the Standard Account may be incapable of offering an 
explanation of a lottery ticket–type scenario, it seems strange that Meirav himself would, in 
practice, neglect to appeal to his wife’s thoughts or experiences when parsing out their different 
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levels of enthusiasm. This is not to say that one’s attitudes toward external factors are irrelevant 
for hope—indeed, it seems that Mike could rightly be said to hold a relatively optimistic view of 
the housing market, and Meirav’s wife may conceive unfavourably of luck. However, Meirav’s 
account seems to disproportionately focus on locating and describing relevant external factors, 
while ruling out the relevance of the agent’s thoughts and experiences for determining whether 
and to what degree one hopes. It thus seems that Meirav has proposed a counterexample to the 
Standard Account that does not accurately reflect how we reason about hope in our own lives.  
Bekka Williams has raised similar difficulties with Meirav’s account in her 2012 paper 
“The Agent-Relative Probability Threshold of Hope.” Like Meirav, Williams considers an 
account to be congruous with the Standard Account if it takes the desiderative and estimative 
criteria as jointly sufficient for hope. As we saw earlier, regardless of the probability threshold, 
Meirav thinks that the Standard Account is left with the problematic possibility that one who 
desires an out outcome and assigns it a non-unity probability that exceeds the threshold 
probability for hope, could nonetheless also be classified as despairing of p (Williams 2012, 
182), such as Meirav and his wife in the lottery ticket example. Williams, however, points out 
that such accounts leave room for massive variation concerning which probabilities count toward 
hope (Williams 2012, 181). Given this, she says, the proponent of the Standard Account could 
simply choose a single, standard threshold for distinguishing hope from despair to prevent 
overlap, thereby avoiding this problem (Williams 2012, 183). This means that in order for 
Meirav’s charge against the Standard Account to stand, it will need to be shown that the 
Standard Account does in fact involve instances of overlapping probability thresholds—a point 
he tries to substantiate with some examples, including our already discussed lottery ticket 
example (Meirav 2009, 183). Williams counters, stating that it is not evident that Meirav’s wife 
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does not also hope to win the lottery, because Meirav has conflated being hopeful regarding p 
with hoping that p (Williams 2012, 183). What Williams means is that Meirav’s wife’s lack of 
enthusiasm or optimism about the prospect need not necessarily amount to an absence of hope.  
To demonstrate her point, Williams offers the example of someone who hopes that she be 
offered a job, despite a lack of enthusiasm or optimism about her prospects (Williams 2012, 
184). Although this may not be an exemplary case of a reasonable hope (depending on the 
degree of enthusiasm and strength of the hope), Williams points out that it does still count as a 
“hope-that,” unless we are altogether ready to deem it contradictory or incoherent (Williams 
2012, 184). Thus, she concludes that the lottery ticket example is not a serious challenge to the 
Standard Account: that Meirav’s wife is not acting hopeful (enthusiastic) about the prospect that 
they will win the lottery leaves it open that she hopes that they win.  
Conversely, Williams suggests that another of Meirav’s examples from “The Nature of 
Hope” does more work for his argument. That example involves Andy and Red, two characters 
sentenced to life in prison for murder in the 1994 film The Shawshank Redemption: 
[Andy and Red] are in many ways similar. They are equally resourceful, they 
understand equally well the workings of the prison and the ways of the prisoners 
and guards inhabiting it, and they have an equal grasp of the very small chances 
of escaping. At the same time, neither of them has lost the desire to be free again 
[…] And yet, Andy lives in the hope of escaping, whereas Red despairs of this. 
Indeed, Red thinks that hope should be resisted, suppressed, for hoping in this 
virtually hopeless situation would threaten his sanity. It seems reasonable to say 
that the film suggests that Andy hopes for freedom and Red does not, in spite of 
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their similar desire for freedom and their assignment of similar probability to 
attaining it. (Meirav 2009, 222-223) 
This example is supposed to be another case in which the Standard Account is unable to 
distinguish between two agents who are identical with respect to the relevant desires and 
probability assessments, wherein one clearly despairs and the other hopes. Williams thinks this 
example more compelling than the lottery ticket example because it does not depend on the 
conflation of enthusiasm and hoping-that, and she therefore concludes that it would be unrealistic 
to say that Red hopes at all for freedom, given that he explicitly states that hoping is pointless on 
numerous occasions in the film (Williams 2012, 185). Despite this, she finds that the difficulty 
this example might pose for the Standard Account is not without its own weaknesses. When 
trying to make sense of how Andy and Red can differ in hope without varying in the Standard 
Account’s criteria for hope, she reminds us that the Standard Account only requires that a hoper 
desires a prospect and (usually implicitly) assigns it a probability greater than zero and less than 
1. She further notes that this “leaves a wide range from which to select the relevant probability 
threshold—which is most appropriately described as the degree of probability lower than which 
[the agent] simply finds continued consideration of the prospect to be pointless” (Williams 2012, 
186). Williams then urges us to notice that this threshold need not be the epistemic probability 
that some prospect will obtain, but rather the probability below which the agent despairs of the 
prospect. If we are careful to make this distinction, then the problem with Andy and Red 
dissolves: if all the Standard Account requires for hope is a non-zero, non-unity probability 
assignment and a desire, this means that Andy and Red could both desire their escape and view 
and assign its epistemic probability an identical value, while having different thresholds for how 
improbable their escape would have to be to make its consideration pointless. It may be the case, 
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for example, that Red simply requires a probability assignment of 0.4 in order to view continued 
consideration of hope worthwhile, while Red may be content to hope with only a 0.1 probability 
assignment. Thinking in this way allows us to explain the difference in their hope by appealing 
to the possibility that Andy and Red simply have different probability thresholds designating the 
point at which hope turns to despair.  
Herein lies Williams’ most forceful objection to Meirav’s case: she asserts that we have 
no reason to believe that whatever probability threshold separates despair from hope is the same 
for everyone (Williams 2012, 186). In other words, it makes sense that the degree of probability 
associated with hopelessness may vary for each person, a fact that Williams proposes can be 
explained by differences in character, and a possibility we saw in practice in my earlier example 
concerning my partner Mike and apartment hunting. Drawing on research concerning risk 
aversion, Williams states that two people may differ in assent to an identical risk, simply because 
“one finds the degree of danger unacceptable [while the other does not]” (Williams 2012, 187). 
If this is the case for risk aversion, it should not be surprising that a probability which justifies 
hope for one person may not justify hope for another. Indeed, had I directly conceded that the 
probability of our finding an apartment we like is 0.7, it is still entirely possible, given the ways 
in which Mike and I differ, that 0.7 may be more than enough to justify hope for him, and not 
enough for me.  
V. Application of the Inclusive Account: Bringing the Agent Back into Hope 
Having now parsed out the proposed relative nature of hope-thresholds, it seems intuitive 
that each agent’s hope threshold could vary according to their character, and it is surprising to 
see the implicit idea of a universal, fixed probability threshold drawn out of Meirav’s argument. 
It is perhaps less surprising if we recall that the original proponents of the Standard Account 
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bracketed several agent-specific, dispositional concerns as outside of the scope of the project. In 
the following and final section, I will (i) explore the ways in which the absence of these 
bracketed concerns may have contributed to the implicit conception of a fixed probability 
threshold and (ii) suggest that the inclusive account may offer guidance about how to build 
relevant agent-relative factors into the Standard Account to avoid problems like Meirav’s.  
At the beginning of this paper, I traced out the original Standard Account as proposed by 
Downie and Day. As part of this, I pointed out some concerns regarding hope which they 
bracketed as beyond the scope of their intent to provide the minimum necessary and sufficient 
conditions for hope. Further, they noted that these concerns indicated areas where more could be 
said about hope. The first of these included Downie’s mention of a “certain conceptual 
connection between ‘hope to do’ and “intend to do’” (Downie 1963, 251), which was also 
echoed by Day’s statement that “‘A wishes that P’ entails ‘A is disposed to bring it about that P’” 
(Day 1991, 98).  
Williams develops this point using her conception of an agent-relative probability 
threshold, saying that being “disposed to bring it about that P” is an example of a behavioural 
criterion that could be used to help determine an agent’s individual probability threshold in a 
given situation. She notes that although determining an individual threshold may certainly be a 
messy or difficult business in some cases, it need not be problematic as long as we are able to 
define it in terms of the degree of probability that that particular agent finds acceptable for hope.  
It is difficult to say whether Downie or Day suspected that being disposed to act was connected 
to hope in this way. However, their above comments suggest that Downie and Day recognized 
that an agent’s individual character was relevant in some way to their hope—namely that the 
agent’s role in hope may not be reducible to a desire and a probability assignment. As Williams 
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proposes, we may begin to incorporate this concern into the Standard Account itself simply by 
explicitly acknowledging that the probability threshold is not fixed. Despite that fact that later 
philosophers such as Meirav were challenging the Standard Account, they were still responding 
to it—it is possible that Downie and Day’s bracketing of this concern set a precedent for 
understanding the particularities of hopeful agents as beyond the scope of what is to be taken into 
account in a theory of hope.  
Secondly, Downie and Day expressed a similar concern that beliefs and hopes were 
perplexingly dissimilar. While we can say “‘A’s hope that P is reasonable although P is 
improbable’” (Downie 1963, 101), the same is not true for beliefs. Again, the nature of this 
concern becomes much clearer if we assume probability thresholds are agent-relative. While 
there are certainly norms that apply to both the rationality of beliefs and the rationality of hope,31 
the threshold of certainty that justifies a belief may be differently policed, or in general need to 
be more fixed—regardless of whether it actually is fixed; this constraint may not be appropriate 
for thresholds for hope, on the other hand. It is likely that people differ with respect to the 
threshold of certainty at which they form a belief, just as Williams proposes they do with respect 
to their thresholds for hope. However, believing involves assenting that p, whereas hope involves 
desiring that p in accordance with a judgement that p is neither impossible nor certain. Desiring 
that p is not the same as assenting that p (or not p) insofar as our desires are not propositions 
capable of being true or false. Because there are methods of verifying, to varying degrees, the 
truth of certain propositions (e.g. the scientific method), we have a normative yardstick against 
which to measure the rationality of someone’s threshold of assent. Excluding special contexts 
involving religious and supernatural claims, where verifiable and public knowledge is concerned, 
it is key to upholding this knowledge that there be an acceptable point around which belief 
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formation thresholds ideally cluster. When shifting to desires that are not truth apt, it is more 
difficult to measure the hope’s rationality, and thus more difficult to rule out any range of 
probabilities as definitely rational or irrational with respect to hope.  
The third complication mentioned by both Day and Downie is that if hope implies a state 
of “comparative expectation” (Downie 1963, 250), then it entails the exhibition of behavioural 
patterns “accompanied by characteristic pleasurable feelings” (Downie 1963, 250). At the 
beginning of the paper, we saw that this kind of comment nods at the existence of a hopeful 
disposition, despite the fact that a full analysis of said hopeful disposition falls outside of the 
scope of the original Standard Account. If we now take Williams’ proposal into consideration, it 
seems that Downie and Day, too, were broaching the importance of the agent-relative aspects of 
hope, while nonetheless leaving them aside for their more circumscribed aims in developing the 
Standard Account. Furthermore, the introduction of an agent-relative probability threshold shines 
further light on what may have been meant by a state of “comparative expectation,” since it gives 
context to and explains the differences in hope between agents, and perhaps even the differences 
in hope within one individual over time, in the case of a gradual character change.  
Proponents of the original Standard Account did not offer answers but asked only 
question regarding these issues. Williams has made explicit the importance of the agent-relative 
probability threshold as a key factor connecting the above complications—complications which 
Day and Downie deemed important enough to mention, yet beyond the scope of their original 
accounts. By considering the way in which the agent-relative threshold illuminates each of the 
above concerns, I hope to have emphasized that William’s work draws out a reflection on the 
agent-relative aspect of hope that may have already been present, albeit implicitly.  
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Indeed, both Pettit and Bovens attempt to further develop the above concerns in their own 
right, not discarding the Standard Account but continuing on the path to which those such as 
Downie and Day had—unwittingly or otherwise—pointed. Through the lens of the agent-relative 
probability threshold, Pettit’s and Boven’s work can be seen as attempts to build in elements of 
the agent-relative factors: Bovens’ mental imaging criterion is a way of assessing whether an 
agent is engaged with a prospect to the degree that it constitutes a hope, and Pettit’s acting-as-if 
criterion is another way of assessing if a particular agent finds a hope worth consideration to the 
extent that they would behave or plan in certain ways. These are indirect measurements insofar 
as they pertain to behaviours whose presence is taken as indicative of hope, and in this way may 
vary with respect to their ability to reliably indicate the presence of actual hope. In fact, this was 
Meirav’s complaint with Pettit’s and Bovens’ accounts—that they are only accurate if one 
assumes that the hope supervenes on the combination of desire and probability assessment. 
Recall that Meirav deems this assumption problematic because it leaves us “unable” to 
distinguish between hope and despair in some contexts.  
At this point, Meirav might have concluded that Pettit’s and Bovens’ attempts to bolster 
the Standard Account by adding criteria referring to hoper’s behaviours did not tell us enough 
about the agent in order to distinguish whether one’s desire, probability assignment, and 
behaviour amount to a hope or not. This is the kind of approach Williams suggests in her 
argument that the probability threshold for hope needs to be defined according to what a 
particular agent judges to be sufficient. However, as we know, Meirav instead posited that it had 
to have been something other than the agent, something in the world that remained to be 
incorporated into the Standard Account if it was going to be capable of distinguishing hope from 
despair in all cases. Given what I have argued, alongside Williams, about the force of Meirav’s 
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examples and the implicit importance of the agent-relative aspect of hope, it appears Meirav 
shifted away from those kinds of concerns that Day and Downie originally expressed as 
importantly linked—albeit, bracketed—to a theory of hope. It is difficult to say which factors 
prompted Meirav to exclude the agent’s character in his attempt to bolster the Standard Account. 
However, it is also difficult not to wonder whether this may be in some way continuous with the 
Standard Accounts’ original presentation of agent-relative concerns as separable from the more 
easily defined, minimum conditions of probability assignment and desire.  
Although it is unlikely that Day and Downie meant to imply that hope could be identified 
in all cases without needing to appeal to facts about the agent, later philosophers were indeed left 
to build hope theory on the back of their account which set the particularities of the agent aside 
(if only in the interest of scope). Subsequently, Pettit’s, Bovens’, and Meirav’s accounts did 
attempt to build in some features that would more accurately identify hope in more cases, but ran 
into problems creating criteria whose presence could reliably entail hope without being 
supplemented with additional information about the hoper. For example, Williams points out that 
Pettit’s acting-as-if criterion does not necessarily entail hope, since one might be planning for 
(acting “as if”) the worst to happen, while hoping for the best (Williams 2012, 191). Conversely, 
one might, from the outside, appear to be “acting as if” a prospect will obtain, while only going 
through the motions related to a prospect of which they despair. As for Bovens’ account, mental 
imaging as a criterion for hope certainly points to the significance of the agent’s own particular 
engagement with hope; according to Williams, “the plausibility of Boven’s claim hinges 
significantly on precisely what qualifies as ‘mental imaging’ or ‘mental engagement’” (Williams 
2012, 191). In other words, what the agent takes to be sufficient, given their individual character, 
will impact whether mental imaging can be said to entail hope. We have already discussed 
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difficulties faced by Meirav’s account, but it is also important to add here that Meirav, with his 
external factor account, faces related problems trying to pinpoint another factor that can 
distinguish hope from despair in special cases.  
As Williams notes, Meirav explicitly states that an agent’s conceiving of an external 
factor as good does not involve a probability assignment—rather, he sees it as the hopers’ 
perception that an external factor is “well disposed” toward them, or their belief in the goodness 
of that factor (Williams 2012, 194). However, this description seems to collapse into the 
Standard Account insofar as such a disposition correlates with “a likelihood that the physical 
world will ‘cooperate’ with one’s desires” (Williams 2012, 194), which could also be modeled as 
a probability assessment. Thus, Meirav’s take runs into the same issue as Pettit and Bovens: the 
external factor can only reliably indicate the presence of hope where it is supplemented with 
further information about a specific hoper. Just as Meirav charges that hope cannot be said to 
supervene on a desire and probability assignment combination, so it is with addition of the 
external factor: it is certainly possible that I could hope for an outcome in which all external 
factors might seem to be against me—a situation which might best be explained by appealing to 
other things about me.  
Interestingly, despite his emphasis on the agent-externality of his account, Meirav 
ultimately states that “it is easier to understand what the goodness of an external factor amounts 
to if the external factor is conceived as a person” (Meirav 2009, 232). Meirav makes this 
comparison to suggest that people reason about hopes and other people in similar ways. 
Specifically, he asserts that the sense of trust one can instill in another person is representative of 
an appraisal of that person as benevolent, and it is this trust that is a deciding factor in whether or 
not one will hope or despair of a prospect. If the external factor can be seen as knowing how to 
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benefit the hoper, and as wanting to do so, this will in turn serve as a basis for hope (233). For all 
his attempts to avoid theorizing further about the agent, Meirav thus concludes his paper by 
describing the role of external factors in terms of an agent. Yet, again, the issue remains that 
hope cannot be taken to supervene on desires and probability assignments, even on an account 
bolstered by the addition of the external factor, without further reference to the particular hoper. 
The disposition to trust may vary greatly from person to person, meaning that where person A 
may trust, person B may not. Further, it is also possible, even if persons A and B did experience 
the same level of trust regarding the same external factor, that what counts as sufficient trust for 
hope may again vary in a way that limits the explanatory power of external factors, without 
further information about A and B.  
Given what has been said about the importance about the agent-relative probability 
threshold for hope, I hope to have shown—with the help of Williams—that attempts to bolster 
the Standard Account with a third criterion are unable to reliably determine whether one hopes in 
all cases. A third criterion cannot account for relevant variability in the agent-specific factors 
contributing to and individual’s own threshold for hope—what they will take as sufficient 
probability, and perhaps sufficient desire in order to justify hoping. Williams’ prescription for 
hope is that we should understand it as such: “An agent A hopes that p if and only if A desires 
that p and assigns to p a non-zero, non-unity probability which A takes to be sufficient to give 
some point to continued consideration of p” (Williams 2012, 195). She points out that hope so 
described may be “rather unilluminating insofar as it does not tell us how to identify the relevant 
probability threshold for any given individual” (Williams 2012, 187).  
This sort of statement seems congruent with Day and Downie’s original decision to factor 
out the discussion of what it means to be “hopeful” on the grounds that it was outside the scope 
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of an account including the minimum necessary and sufficient conditions for hope. However, 
Williams’ making explicit the agent-relative nature of the probability threshold more explicitly 
opens the door for exploration of those factors which can reasonably be taken to influence an 
individuals’ threshold for hope. This is where my proposed Inclusive Account of hope becomes 
relevant. If the Standard Account can better identify hope when it is revised to incorporate, as 
important, what an agent takes as sufficient to hope, it may be strengthened by also taking into 
account factors which plausibly influence how a person hopes, and whether they will see an 
occasion as an opportunity for hope or reason to despair. In other words, factoring into the 
account the importance of an agent’s disposition with regards to hope can increase our accuracy 
in separating cases of hope from cases that are not hope.  
I see no reason why psychological research about hope should be off limits in this 
investigation, especially since this research utilizes self-report and personal accounts of hope and 
despair. Earlier, we saw that the psychological literature contains a wealth of information about 
the very factors that contribute to a person either disposed or indisposed to hope. Specifically, we 
explored the ways in which the CDF and SAF help explicate how one’s environment is always 
already shaped by the hoper’s perceptions, depending on their sense of trust or mistrust of the 
world, responsiveness to the world, and their active engagement with it. I suggest we see these 
factors as potential guidelines when identifying an agent’s own threshold for hope. This is in 
large part because of the way in which the CDF and SAF tell us more about the hoper than 
simply that a hoper desires that p, or whether they think p neither impossible nor certain. Rather, 
because the CDF and SAF tell us something about the way hopers see or experience the world, 
which tells us more about that particular agent herself, instead of telling us about a disembodied 
desire, probability assignment, or external factor.  
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Originally, Downie and Day neglected to account for a hopeful disposition as part of the 
Standard Account because this complex task extended far beyond their original aims. 
Philosophers such as Nancy Snow and Michael Lamb have recently developed such detailed, 
dispositional accounts of hope.32 Here, I am not proposing anything so complicated as merging a 
dispositional account of hope with the Standard Account. Instead, I suggest that if we take 
Williams’ advice, and add the agent-relative caveat to the existing philosophical definition of 
hope, philosophers ought also consider CDF and SAF as illuminating factors for painting a fuller 
picture of hope. This means, instead of building another catchall criterion into the Standard 
Account when a borderline case of hope arises, philosophers would build some flexibility into 
their accounts by examining the ways in which a particular hoper’s developmental histories and 
self-styled agentic thought might contextualize the more abstract criteria of the Standard 
Account.   
Endnotes 
 
1 For a similar account, see (Day 1991). 
2 For other additional bids to expand upon the standard account, see Govier 2011, Kadlac 2015, 
and Lamb 2016. 
3 See Erdman 2013. 
4 See Downie 1963, 250. 
5 See Meirav 2009, Pettit 2004, and McGeer 2004 for convincing objections and alternative 
accounts. 
6 Meirav further illustrates an example inherited from Bovens, concerning the film The 
Shawshank Redemption. For more, see Meirav 2009, 222-223. 
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7 For further explanation of Meirav’s approach to subjective probability here, see Kaplan 1996, 
especially page 15.  
8 Meirav makes it clear that the external factor is not necessary for distinguishing hope from 
despair in all cases, such as those in which probability assignments are relatively high (Meirav 
2009, 231).  
9 See McGeer 2004; Govier 2011, Calhoun 2018. 
10 See Averill et al. 1990, 150. 
11 “Subjects rated their perceived control over the event of an 11-point scale. The scale ran from 
0 (‘completely due to factors under your own control’) to 10 (‘completely due to factors beyond 
your control’)” (Averill et al. 1990, 25). 
12 It is possible that this result could be an artefact of the western college student population used 
in this study, specifically where the socially desirable response of working harder, and the proto-
rule of hope concerning the inappropriateness of hoping for things that are not socially accepted, 
e.g. malicious outcomes.   
13 For one of the earliest formulations of the theory, see (Snyder, et al. 1991). 
14 See Snyder 1994, especially pp. 9–12. 
15 For further examples of self-referential thinking indicative of hope levels, see Snyder 1994, 
(44–45; 84–88). 
16 See Shorey 2014. 
17 For a related account of this feedback loop see Bandura 1977 on “self-efficacy.” 
18 See Bishop 2016 for further reading on the ubiquity of self-reinforcing “positive causal 
networks” in positive psychology. 
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19 The self-reinforcing cycle Snyder references here corresponds with the experiences of many of 
Snyder’s research participants and is closely related to Albert Bandura’s theory of “self-efficacy” 
(Bandura, 1977). 
20 See: Snyder 1994, 84; van Leishout 1979, 179.  
21 See: Bowlby 1969, 11: “What is believed to be essential for mental health is that the infant and 
young child should experience a warm, intimate, and continuous relationship with [his or her 
primary caregiver] in which both find satisfaction and enjoyment.” This describes what Bowlby 
calls a “secure” attachment. 
22 This corresponds to McGeer’s 2004 characterization of hope as a “scaffolding.” 
23 See Bai and Repetti 2015. 
24 See also Ainsworth 1975; Ong et al. 2006. 
25 See also Ainsworth and Bell, 1974. 
26 See Erikson, 1963: “Infants should develop a continuity and dependability about their 
environment if they have quality relationships with primary caregivers during the first two years” 
(Erikson, 1963 as cited in Snyder 1994, 88).  
27 Note that this satisfies Meirav’s concern about the sense of trust or mistrust of the world. 
28 Similarly, Shorey et al. found that parenting styles that encouraged agency through engaged 
support and discipline contributed to the attachment, and the hopeful thinking lead to positive 
mental health outcomes (Shorey et al. 2014, 691). 
29 Here I use the notion of being-in-the world in a Merleau-Pontian sense, with the aim of 
characterizing hope as a dynamic process which does not take place either entirely within the 
“subjective” world or mind of the hoper, nor as a response to “objective” stimuli from an 
external environment. The term being-in-the-world for Merleau-Ponty emphasizes the lack of 
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clear boundaries between oneself and one’s world due to a “fundamental ambiguity of all human 
experience and phenomena (PhP, lxxviii, as cited in Landes 2013, 29). For Merleau-Ponty we are 
uniquely situated within the world thanks to our bodies, thanks to which our way of existing “is 
not a relation between an objective body and a consciousness; rather, it is a ‘pre-objective 
perspective’ that undermines the very distinctions between first person and third person 
perspectives, and thus represents a genuine intertwining between consciousness and nature (PhP 
81, as cited in Landes, 29).  
30 My approach in this section will draw largely on a methodology inspired by Merleau-Ponty’s 
Phenomenology of Perception, in which the author critiques philosophical views by exploring 
the ways in which certain theoretical commitments lead theorists to conclusions that gloss over 
or betray aspects of phenomena as they are actually experienced. 
31 For one account of such norms or “proto-rules” of hope, see Averill et al. 1990, 33-35. 
32 See: Snow 2013; Lamb 2016. 
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